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The Financial Services Authority’s review of With Profits policies has been motivated by a 
perception that consumer understanding of these products is insufficiently developed. This paper 
suggests that these concerns have not so much been overstated as misguided. With profits policies 
are complicated but consumers don’t need to understand them.  
 
Their merits need restating. Recent research has concluded that perhaps the majority of 
households actually hold their mortgage debt for longer than previously thought. This adds 
weight to the view that equity-backed mortgages are the most suitable repayment vehicles. 
Because with profits endowment policies (the majority of with profits policies) expose savers to 
the higher returns from the stock market while minimising the risk of temporary 
underperformance, they therefore represent a particularly beneficial package for a surprisingly 
large cohort of the financially unsophisticated, home owning population. This simple truth 
appears to be getting lost in the debate about their complexity and opacity. 
 
In fact the criticisms of with profits products are simply missing the point. It is not the complexity 
of the products that leads to distortions in the market but their low surrender values. Comparing 
with profits policies with the markets for automobiles and prescription medicines, to take two 
examples, illustrates the fatuous nature of the idea that consumers need much greater disclosure 
than at present. Rather consumers need information about the quality of the providers and the 
intermediaries. Automobiles and prescription medicines are far more complicated than with 
profits policies. Yet in the automobile industry the manufacturer’s reputation is sufficient to 
ensure that the vast majority of consumers do not need to know the technical specifications of 
model A versus model B. And similarly it is sufficient for most patients to know that their 
Medical Practitioner recommends a particular prescription medicine. For consumers of financial 
products, it is the reputation of the provider and intermediary that are of paramount importance in 
product selection. While greater efforts on behalf of providers may enhance consumer 
understanding, there must be strong doubts about whether this would actually increase consumer 
welfare. Disclosure is not the problem, so more information is not the answer.  
 
The real problem is that the costs to consumers of being locked into a contract are too high. 
Because providers have moved to the front-loading of charges, the surrender value of policies in 
the early years is far below the investment value of whatever funds have been invested. Very low 
surrender values lead to very high switching costs, and so consumers whose circumstances 
change or who lose confidence in their provider are left with little alternative either to cease 
completely or to continue reluctantly with what might be their principal form of savings. The 
FSA ought to consider methods of ensuring that consumers are able to switch policies at low cost. 
With reasonable assumptions about normal competitive behaviour, this alone would eliminate the 
worst distortions to the with profits market. 
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I. Introduction 
The Financial Services Authority has recently and in quick succession undertaken a 
review of pensions, a somewhat heavy-handed and critically pre-disposed survey of 
endowment policies, and now the With Profits Review. While the earlier investigations 
were motivated first by legitimate grievances over pensions mis-selling and second by 
confusion over diminishing endowment returns in a low inflation regime, the current 
review is motivated primarily by a perception that consumer understanding of with profit 
policies is insufficiently developed. (FSA 2001a; FSA 2001b) In particular the review has 
been directed to focus on six related sub-projects:  
• transparency and policyholder communications, 
• unfair contract terms,  
• governance and discretion over the operation of with profits funds,  
• disclosure to customers and regulatory reporting,  
• inherited estates, and  
• the interests and fair treatment of customers. 
 
Most of these sub-projects are concerned with the information consumers receive from 
with profits providers. While the ownership status of orphan assets (inherited estates) is a 
debatable issue for the law courts to decide, and the investment practices of individual 
fund managers (governance and discretion) is unlikely to be of more than a passing 
interest to consumers, the Review’s concerns with transparency, contract terms, 
disclosure and fair treatment are all essentially different ways of trying to ensure that 
more consumers understand more about what they are purchasing. 
 
Within the review process there has been considerable discussion about the apparent 
dilemma of explaining what is necessarily a very complex product to unsophisticated 
consumers. For instance, a recent piece of research commissioned by the Review 
produced what must be the most asinine conclusion of the year: that customers do not 
understand fully what they are purchasing. (FSA, 2002, annex B – and note that the 
researchers discovered that consumers were still satisfied with their with profits policies.) 
Needless to say the media have been full of discussion about the apparent problems of ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
Copyright 2002 Andrew Godley  2
these allegedly ‘outdated’ with profits policies. This paper makes one simple point, that 
product complexity alone is not a sufficient requirement for forcing providers to move 
down the road to full product disclosure. Furthermore, the tangible risk to continuing 
with such an unstructured and poorly specified debate is that consumer confidence may 
be eroded and so many potential customers of with profits policies will select alternative 
and less suitable vehicles for saving. Let it be recalled that in 1997, before the survey of 
endowment policies, nearly 50% of all mortgages were backed by an endowment policy. 
After two years of widely publicised but ultimately unsubstantiated criticism during the 
equivalent review process, the market share of endowment policies had fallen to 13%.
1  
 
II. With Profits Policies – beneficial for whom? 
The benefits of with profits policies need to be restated. They are three-fold.  
1. The principal reason why they exist is because for long term savers equity-backed 
investments generate a higher return than alternatives  
2. With profits policies smooth otherwise volatile stock market returns 
3. With profits policies offer a set of guaranteed returns at maturity and at death. 
 
Equity backed savings policies 
The majority of with profits policies are endowments. Most potential consumers of with 
profits endowment policies are home-owners wanting to use a high value vehicle to repay 
their mortgage. That equity-backed repayment vehicles are particularly suitable for this 
group has been underlined by recent research that suggests that perhaps half of all 
mortgagors actually remain indebted for longer than the industry’s standard twenty-five 
year product term. (Godley, 2002) This initially may seem surprising, or counter-
intuitive, given the popular perception that the day of the final mortgage payment is a 
significant lifetime event. But recent developments in the economic theory of consumer 
behaviour suggest that many households may extend the terms of their repayment periods 
as needs-based expenditure increases temporarily. (See Muellbauer, 1999 for a recent 
survey.) In a world where many households may select to reduce monthly mortgage 
repayment premiums in order to, say, better afford university fees or a step up the 
                                                 
1 FACT, 2000, p. 16. This outcome may of course be multicausal. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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housing ladder, household mortgage indebtedness may well last significantly longer than 
twenty-five years. There is nothing sacrosanct about twenty-five years as the upper limit 
to the repayment period, at least in theory. 
 
In reality we don’t actually know how long people take to repay their mortgage, for there 
is little research on debt management strategies among home owners. A recent study of a 
sample of mortgage applications in the South East of England suggested that among 
those house owners trading up (or nearly three quarters of the total), fully 71% extended 
their repayment periods leading to an average increase over the whole population of 2.0 
years, from 25.0 to 27.0 years. Despite the additional period of borrowing and saving 
being only two years, because of compound growth rates on the capital sums invested, an 
endowment policy would outperform a straight repayment policy by around 20% for this 
cohort of borrowers. (Godley, 2002)  
 
Mortgage borrowers have been for many years the largest single group of with profits 
endowment policy consumers, and so these results need emphasising. Because many 
people borrow for longer, their most suitable repayment vehicles are equity backed. 
Moreover, because the vast majority of mortgagors are also financially unsophisticated, 
the other benefits of with profits policies come into force. 
 
 Smoothing and Guarantees 
While stock market returns have historically proven to outstrip any other method of 
saving, the underlying volatility of stock market prices means that there is always a risk 
at any one moment in time that the investment may be priced at a level below that 
required for repaying a mortgage. While the risk is linked to the term of investment (so 
that the risk of underperformance is lower for those who actually borrow for longer than 
twenty-five years), the risk is never removed. (Godley, 2002) For the risk averse and/ or 
financially unsophisticated the advantage of a with profits policy is that providers 
‘smooth’ the profits over time, so reducing the risk to consumers from stock market 
volatility. This, along with setting minimum guarantees to the eventual capital sum on 
maturity and at death, means that with profits policies are designed to combine attractive ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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rates of investment growth with minimising the risk of any temporary underperformance 
of the underlying assets, and with the security of knowing that the required amount will 
actually be paid. This makes them ideal products for the relatively cautious and 
financially unsophisticated. This is especially so for any first time borrowers who might 
at some stage want to trade up and extend the term of their mortgage. With profits 
policies are in other words ideally suited to those young couples buying their first 
property who may want to start a family and then, at some stage in the future, may want 
to move into a larger family house. Because of the increase in the costs of dependents just 
at the time of trading up, many in this cohort may well prefer to reduce their monthly 
premiums by extending their repayment period. This is a large cohort of the total 
mortgage borrowing population.  
 
Nevertheless, even if with profits endowment policies are an ideal product for very many 
borrowers, the combination of their fast growth and minimum risk also makes them 
considerably more complex to manage than, say, ordinary unit trusts.  
 
This is the crucial difference between with profits policies and alternative vehicles such 
as straight repayment mortgages, for instance. With profits policies are complicated. 
Critics pointing to consumers’ lack of understanding have accepted that the product does 
contain the advantage of excellent consumer value from the underlying investment 
performance. They just bemoan providers’ inability to explain to consumers the 
complexity of hedging stock market volatility against, say, bond market security. Critics 
should note that it takes some undergraduate students of finance several years of study to 
grasp some of the underlying intricacies involved here! Expectations of consumers’ 
abilities to properly understand the products need to be realistic. More importantly, 
however, product complexity does not necessarily mean that providers are badly failing 
their customers. That is because complexity is not the real issue. 
 
III. Cars, Medicines and With Profits Policies 
The economics of the with profits market is essentially very simple. A with profits policy 
is a complex product; but then so are many other products. Comparing the market for ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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with profits policies with automobiles and prescription medicines, for example, illustrates 
the fatuous nature of the idea that consumers need substantially greater disclosure than at 
present in order to understand what they are purchasing.  
 
Automobiles and prescription medicines are technically far more complicated than with 
profits policies, yet consumers make almost no attempt to understand them in any detail.
2 
Rather when purchasing an automobile, the competing manufacturers’ reputations are 
sufficient to ensure that the vast majority of consumers do not feel the need to know the 
technical specifications of model A versus model B, even if they had the engineering 
competence. And similarly it is sufficient for most patients to know that their Medical 
Practitioner recommends a particular prescription medicine. The medical knowledge 
required to correctly interpret the information about competing prescription medicines is 
far beyond the average patient’s education.  
 
In principal a similar logic should apply to complex savings instruments. Consumers 
ought to be more interested in the reputations of the provider and intermediary rather than 
in the mechanics of swaps and futures markets. And in fact, as successive surveys show, 
this is exactly what is of paramount importance to consumers making their selection 
decisions. (FSA, 2002, para. 16) Furthermore, the specific items of information that 
consumers say they require are actually quite modest. Consumers say that they need clear 
information on the current value of their investment, projected or target value, and the 
guaranteed value on death. (FSA, 2002, para. 17) And while some providers do appear to 
do their best to obscure this in the annual statements, it would not require an enormous 
investment in upgrading disclosure procedures to disseminate this information more 
clearly. Beyond this limited amount of greater clarity, there is apparently little additional 
information that most consumers actually want. There must in other words be very strong 
doubts about whether any substantial increase in product disclosure to consumers would 
actually lead to any significant gain either in consumer understanding of the product or, 
                                                 
2 As are any number of other products and services: utilities (gas, water, electricity), metals production, 
mining, and of course new information technology products, as well as many others. Cars and medicines 
are used here simply because of their ubiquity, and hence our familiarity with their complexity. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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more importantly, in consumer welfare. If disclosure is not the problem, more 
information is not the answer.  
 
IV. With Profits Switching Costs are too high 
In fact the real difference between consumers in the automobile or prescription medicine 
market and the market for with profits policies is the product commitment. If consumers 
of automobiles decide that the actual consumption experience was less satisfactory than 
the provider had promised, they can switch cars. If the patient decides that the course of 
treatment is not effective, then it is relatively straightforward to switch to a different 
therapy. In the market for with profit policies, however, the real distortion is that 
consumers are close to being locked into a contract when the switching costs are so high.  
 
These switching costs (or, in the industry jargon, surrender values) are high (or surrender 
values are low) because providers have moved to loading their charges during the early 
years of the policy. Recent data published by the FSA suggests that the effect of front-
loading is to reduce the return in endowments by as much as 31% in the early years. But 
this then falls away to only 1.5% over the product’s full twenty-five year period, or the 
same as for ISAs and other much less complex products. (ABI, 2002) Thus the surrender 
values of policies in the early years are typically far below the investment value of 
whatever funds have been invested. But because these switching costs are so high, 
consumers are either locked into what appear to be unsatisfactory outcomes, or do switch 
but have to pay the full balance of charges in doing so. 
 
Rather than insisting on providers producing more complete and sophisticated Key 
Features Documents and related product literature, the FSA ought therefore to consider 
methods of ensuring that consumers are able to switch policies at low cost. Just as with 
any other complex good or service, so consumers of with profits policies would then be 
able to rely on a combination of provider reputation and the counsel of a trusted advisor 
before making their product selection. If a consumer’s circumstances then changed, or if 
the actual product was unsatisfactory, so a future with profits consumer could trade in the 
old policy for a new one; one promising faster growth, or more healthy returns. Because ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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all providers would have to compete for customer loyalty, providing consumers with the 
necessary information would become an essential marketing tool in order simply to retain 
existing business. This reform alone would therefore eliminate the worst distortions to the 
with profits market.  
 
Providers may claim that the net effect of spreading charges over the product’s life would 
inevitably lead to higher costs and so higher charges. But the gains in welfare arising 
from giving consumers more direct and immediate control over their investments would 
easily outweigh any marginal increase in their costs. 
 
Such a reform would not be too complicated to introduce. Establishing an acceptable 
benchmark for surrender values could be trivial, simply adopting a formula relating 
contributions to underlying fund performance with modest deductions for annual 
management charges, for example. FSA kitemarks could then be given to all policies that 
have suitably low surrender values (perhaps based on a suitably modified version of the 
Association of British Insurers’ ‘Raising Standards’ quality mark). The FSA would 
simply need to insist that IFAs and other intermediaries have to highlight to consumers 
whether a product has been awarded the kitemark or not. 
 
In conclusion, while the current With Profits Review may be driven by a consumer 
reformist agenda, it is clearly not driven by any coherent economic analysis of improving 
consumer welfare. Even the simplest view of the product and its market would conclude 
that complexity alone cannot justify further regulatory burdens. Indeed, the additional 
regulatory costs of full product disclosure may well end up pricing the product out of the 
market and so unintentionally doing greatest harm to precisely those the regulators seek 
to protect - the financially unsophisticated consumer. The principal conclusion of this 
paper therefore is that a more carefully specified debate about the alleged merits and 
demerits of with profits policies and the nature of the with profits market would 
inevitably produce more important results, better guided research, and ultimately more 
reliable conclusions. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2002-16 
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